Mark John Biggins, Articles M

14. X, 1 (political subdivisions may exercise only "[tax] power granted to them" by Missouri General Assembly). The District Court took no action to reverse its tax increase through fiscal year 1988-1989. Missouri v. Jenkins | Oyez - {{meta.fullTitle}} App. The attorneys in the case pursued compensation from Missouri for theirs and their paralegals' services. Missouri v. Jenkins No. . 487 of "magnet schools" to promote desegregation. At the outset, it must be noted that the Court of Appeals made no "modifications" to the District Court's order. [495 to Pet. 377 The court again faced the problem of funding, for KCMSD's efforts to persuade the voters to approve a tax increase had failed, as had its efforts to seek funds from the Kansas City Council and the state legislature. The Hancock Amendment thus prevents KCMSD from obtaining any revenue increase as a result of increases in the assessed valuation of real property. (1947). for Cert. A few examples are illustrative. 1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. If, however, judicial discretion is to provide the sole limit on judicial remedies, that discretion must counsel restraint. But if today's dicta become law, such lessons will be of little use to students who grow up to become taxpayers in the KCMSD. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it required the District Court to modify its funding order and reversed insofar as it allowed the tax increase imposed by the District Court to stand. Whether or not KCMSD student achievement levels are still "at or below national norms at many grade levels" clearly is not the appropriate test for deciding whether a previously segregated district has achieved partially unitary status. The District Court orders in this case suggest the pitfalls of the first course. [495 (Rehnquist, C.J.) See, e. g., App. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. We share respondents' concern about the stability and clarity of jurisdictional rules. U.S. 294, 299 In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of a desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. denied sub nom. U.S. 358 1 A desegregation order was issued by the court including details of how to remedy the situation and the financial . App. (1881); United States v. New Orleans, 1978), and KCMSD filed a cross-claim against the State, seeking indemnification for any liability that might be imposed on KCMSD for intradistrict segregation. power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system." Other Circuits routinely treat documents so labeled Instead, the District Court's conclusion that desegregation might be easier if more nonminority students could be attracted into the KCMSD was used as the hook on which to hang numerous policy choices about improving the quality of education in general within the KCMSD. Hubert v. Mayor and Council of New Orleans, denied sub nom. Does the Eleventh Amendment bar an enlarged fee award against a State to compensate late payment? United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372-1373 (1975) (District Court may "implement its desegregation order by directing that provision be made for the levying of taxes"); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320, cert.